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CIVIL JUDICIAL STATISTICS. The recent publication for Parlia-
ment of Part II. of the Judicial Statistics for England and Wales for
1894, entitled Civil and Judicial Statistics, contains many valuable
facts as to the amount of litigation in England for the past thirty
years. A careful introduction by Dr. Macdonnell reviews the
subject-matter contained in the subjoined tables and diagrams.
Though he shows that, in proportion to the population, more busi-
ness is done by the Appellate Courts in England than by the
Supreme Court of the United States, he does not furnish us with any
statistics as to our state courts, and therefore we have no means of
determining the relative litigious propensities of the two nations.
It would be presumptuous in a foreigner to attempt to draw
conclusions from these statistics, without an understanding of
English judicial conditions, but there are several facts we may note
with interest.
In proportion to the population, Dr. Macdonnell shows that liti-
gation in England is slowly, but steadily, decreasing, this fact being
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attributable in some measure to the growth of arbitration. The
number of appeals, however, has greatly increased, and the general
drift of business has been away from the Queen's Bench Division to
the County courts. Dr. Macdonnell estimates the plaintiff's
chances of recovery as three to one, and in criminal cases the
Crown's chances as tour to one, in view of which facts it seems very
creditable to the honesty of the English people that litigation is
steadily on the decline.
The business of the divorce courts has perceptibly increased since
1858; but the most striking fact is, the marked decrease in all
courts of the number of jury trials. In the past sixteen years in the
Queen's Bench Division, they have decreased from ninety-two to
fourty-seven per cent. of the cases decided.
Finally, we may note as a mark of the advance of civilization,
that crimes of violence are steadily diminishing, and that in their
place people are seeking redress by litigation, as evidenced by the
contemporaneous increase of suits for personal torts. If litigation
is supplanting crime, and amicable arbitration between nations
and between individuals is to supplant contentious litigation and
internecine war, are we not really making steady progress toward
a Utopian society?
FORGED ENDORSEMENTS. A decision by the Court of Appeals
of Indian Territory, Green v. Purcell Nat. Bank, 37 S. W. 50
(1896), deserves commendation on account of the clear reasoning
of the court, and should be specially noticed in view of Mr. Jus-
tic Matthew's recent opinion, London, etc., Bank v. Bank of Liver-
*Pool, 12 B. D. 7 (1896), reaching a contrary conclusion through a
misapplication of prior decisions. The Purcell Bank received a
check from Green for collection. The drawee bank in New York
honored the check, and Green was paid. The payee's name hav-
ing been forged, the Purcell Bank repaid the drawee bank the
amount of the check, without notifying Green of the forgery.
About three months later, the bank received another check from
Green, collected it and accredited the proceeds to the amount
previously paid Green on the forged check. Green thereupon
sued for the amount.
The court refused a recovery on the ground that Green had no
title to the forged check, hence could claim nothing under it.
" In law he was charged with the knowledge of the forgery, the
beneficiary of which he became by his own acts. He stood in the
forger's shoes, and, however innocent, he may have been in fact,
yet in lav having received the stolen goods, he acquired no better
title than the thief himself would have had."
In the English case plaintiff bank was drawee of a bill; the
payee's name was forged, but through ignorance of this fact, the
plaintiff paid the bill to defendant. Some months afterward the
forgery was discovered, and this suit brought. Mr. Justice Mathew
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refused a recovery upon the ground that "when a bill becomes due
and is presented for payment the holder ought to know at once
whether the bill is going to be paid or not. If the mistake is dis-
covered at once, it may be the money can 'be recovered back;.
but if it be not, and the money is paid in good faith, and is.
received in good faith, and there is an interval of time in which
the position of the holder may be altered, the principle seems to
apply that money once paid cannot be recovered back." This
principle is deduced from cases like Cocks v. Masternian, 9 B. &
C. 9o2, and Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. X355, where a forged drawing,
instead of a forged endorsement, was before the court.
With deference, it is suggested that this principle is entirely
inapplicable to a case where a defendant desires to hold funds
obtained upon an instrument to which he had no title. However,
it may be justified by commercial necessity in cases where, owing
to a forged drawing, no contract existed.
As long ago as 1841 the Supreme Court of New York, per Mr.
Justice Cowen, permitted a recovery in Canal Bank v. Bank of
Albany, I Hill, 287, a case not distinguishable, in fact, from the
English case.
The principle of the Indian Territory court has been recognized
in Pennsylvania: Chambers v. Union Bank, 78 Pa. 205 (1875).
See also Keener on Quasi Contracts, 154, note.
RAILWAYS; NEGLIGENCE; DUry TO TRESPASSERS. The dissent
of Magruder, C. J., in the late case of Wabash R. R. Co. v. Jones,
(45 N. E. 5o) Supreme Court of Illinois, while taken on a point
of pleading, marks an attempt to escape the consequences of the
Illinois rule on the subject of duty to trespassers on railroads.
The material facts were that a child was injured, while walking
on the track, in a manner and for a purpose pursued by many of
the community and sanctioned by a usage of twenty-five years.
The railroad company sought to escape liability for its servant's
alleged want of care, on the ground that plaintiff was a trespasser.
To this view the majority of the court inclined.
The jurisdictions adopting the Illinois view hold that the rail-
road never has any duty toward persons found on its tracks other
than the duty to avoid wilful injury, unless those persons have been
positively invited by the railroad company to go upon its tracks.
They draw a sharp "distinction between cases where there is a
mere naked license or permission to enter upon or pass over an
estate and cases where the owner or occupant holds out any entice-
ment, allurement or inducement to persons to enter upon or pass
over his property: " .Ry. v. Bodemer, 139 Ills. 596 (1892). The
view which is found in the majority of American jurisdictions is
clearly expressed by Boggs, P. J., in the decision of this same case
in the appellate court : 123 Ills. 125 (1893). "We do not think
that this evidence was admitted for the purpose, as is supposed, of
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establishing a legal right in the plaintiff to be upon the track; its
admission was proper for another purpose. . . If the evidence
. . . tended to show that persons were likely to be upon the track
at the time when and at the place where the appellee was injured,
and that the company had notice thereof and had reason to antici-
pate the presence of persons there, though trespassers, then . . .
the evidence was competent."
This theory does not require the railroad constantly to exercise
vigilance, in order to ascertain whether the track is free; the com-
pany is not required to anticipate the presence of any unauthorized
persons upon its tracks, in the absence of knowledge or notice.
"The degree of care required in the operation of trains is pro-
portioned to the danger likely to result therefrom: " Texas &- P.
R. Co. v. Watkins, 26 S. W. 760 (1894).
This is the rule followed in New York, Pennsylvania, Missouri,
Powell v. R. Co., 59 Mo. Ap. 626 (1894) ; Wisconsin, Johnson v.
R., 86 Wis. 63, 56 N. W. 161 (1893), and most of the western
States. The Massachusetts view is somewhat uncertain. In
Chenery v, Fitchburg, etc., R., i6o Mass. 211, it was held that the
existence of a license by acquiescence to cross at a private way was
a question for the jury. The Illinois rule prevails in Alabama and
a few other States.
The first case in Illinois laying down the rule now followed in
that State wasR. v. Godfrey, 71 Ills. 500 (1874). This case (which
did not go quite the length of the principal case, since the decision
was based partly on the contributory negligence of the plaintiff)
seems to have been decided largely on the authoiity of the Penn-
sylvania cases of R. v. Hummel, 44 Pa. 375, and Gillis v. R., 59
Pa. 129. In R. v. Hummel, Strong, J., employed what is now
generally regarded as a mistaken analogy in the following language:
"There is as perfect a duty to guard against accidental injury to
a night intruder into one's bed-chamber as there is to look out for
trespassers upon a railroad where the public has no right to be."
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, R. v. Wrymore, 40 Neb. 645, 58
N. W. 1120 (1894), refused to follow this ruling.
This expression of Mr. Justice Strong was, nevertheless, quoted
with approval by Sharswood, J., in Gillis v. R. (supra), and the
latter judge on the authority of R. v. Hummel (supra) dissented in
Xay v. P. R. Co., 65 Pa. 269 (1879). It was held, in this case,
distinguishing and virtually overruling R. v. Hummel, (at least
so far as it was made use of in the Illinois cases), that if a railroad
company allowed the neighboring population to use its tracks as a
way, the presumption of a clear track could not arise as in other
parts of the road, and that greater precaution was necessary under
these circumstances than elsewhere. To the same effect is Taylor
v. Canal Co., 113 Pa. 162 (1886).
The Illinois courts continue to cite R. v. Hummel (supra) and
Gissel v. R. (supra), as though they embodied the Pennsylvania
law on the subject.
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The Supreme Court of Washington, in a case almost on all fours
with the present one, Roth v. Union Depot Co., 13 Wash. 525
(x896), have gone into a most elaborate and exhaustive survey of
the authorities, and have reached a conclusion 'contrary to that of
the Illinois court. It is interesting to observe that Hoyt, C. J.,
dissents, on the ground that he can see no difference between the
duty of a railroad to trespassers, and that of any other land holder.
This analogy is surely a false one. Certainly a railway does owe
some duty of caution toward persons whose presence on the track
it has reason to anticipate. Common justice and humanity demand
that a railroad use a greater degree of care in a crowded country
where it knows that trespassers are likely to be, than in lonely and
unfrequented places. To this demand the great majority of author-
ities respond, and the Supreme Court of Illinois, when it frees the
railroad in such cases from liability for all negligence except such
gross want of care as will amount to wilfulness, announces a rule of
law which few jurisdictions approve.
INTERFERENCE WITH TRADE MARKS-WHEN INJUNCTION WILL
BE GRANTED. In the case of Lafeau et a. v. Weeks, Pa. Adv.
Rep. 27, Nov. 1896, 177 Pa. 412, complainant filed a bill praying
that the defendant be restrained from fraudulently making use of a
certain trade mark, which complainant alleges is an infringement
upon his own, which is registered and thus described in the Patent
Office: "Our trade mark consists of the letters P. C. W. These
letters have generally been arranged as shown in the accompanying
fac-simile, in which they appear as script, printed in a horizontal
line upon a background of any suitable color; but other forms of
letters may be employed, or they may be differently arranged,
without materially altering the character of our trade mark, the
essential features of which are the letters P. C. W."
Complainant had been engaged for a long number of years in
manufacturing candies and his goods had obtained a high reputa-
tion, when the defendant entered the business and registered a trade
mark consisting of the letters W. H. W., to be printed in script,
in white, on a dark ground. It appeared that in both cases the
letters were the initials of the founder of the business.
In addition to these facts, the master found that the defendant
had been a manufacturer and commission merchant in the candy
trade. That in the latter capacity he had handled the plaintiff's
goods till within a short time before the bringing of this suit, when
he had commenced manufacturing on a larger scale and given up
dealings with the plaintiff. That at this time he had ceased to use
the markings formerly employed by him upon his boxes, and had
adopted in all respects those of the plaintiffs. The latter had
printed the letters P. C. W., in script, in white, on a red back-
ground, upon a label which was pasted on the boxes. The
defendant pasted similar labels with the letters W. H. W. upon
NOTES.
similar boxes. The plaintiff had invented names for different
varieties of his goods, which defendant also copied, printing them
upon the ends of the boxes in a like style with that in use by
plaintiff. The arrangement of the candies was also imitated, as.
was their size, shape, and color. The defendant, upon being
notified that he was infringing the plaintiffs rights and causing
deception, refused to change his methods.
From these facts the master drew the following conclusions, viz.:
"That the defendant's trade mark and label bear such similarity
of appearance to those of the plhintiffs as to be likely to deceive-
persons of ordinary intelligence, measured by the general standard
of the mass of people dealing in and buying such goods and using
reasonable care and caution." . . . "That cases of actual
deception in this respect have taken place." . . . And "that
the design on the part of the defendant in adopting and using the
present trade mark and label, and the use of the boxes and pack-
ages and names in question was and is to deceive buyers and pur-
chasers of the defendant's goods, and to enable them to sell their
manufactures on the strength of the popularity of the goods of the
plaintiffs." That though "the initials P. C. W. do not consti-
tute a valid technical trade mark in the sense of preventing their
use by defendants, without intent to deceive, of the initial letters
W. H. W., which is the form adopted, and which, in connection
with the similar style of the packages, names, and label, bear a
close resemblance to the initials P. C. W.-yet that under the
facts of this case, as hereinbefore found, the defendants have no
legal right to the use of the initials W. H. W. in the form and
upon the style of label adopted by them, and that such use consti-
tutes a fraud upon the plaintiffs, against which they are entitled to
relief." And the master therefore recommended that an injunction
be granted restraining the defendant from printing the initials W..
H. W. in script, in white, in a horizontal line, upon a red back-
ground, which injunction the court issued.
On review by the Supreme Court, it was held that the decree
had gone beyond the plaintiff's claim. That the defendant had a.
right to use his own initials, and that the plaintiff could not claim
an exclusive right to the use of any particular lines, colors, or
methods of packing his goods, as such things are in their nature
common to all men. That it was, therefore, apparent that plaintiff
had no valid trade mark, and his only complaint being that his
trade mark had been infringed, his claim was fully answered, and
the lower court erred in giving relief in such a case. "If," said
the court, "the defendants are really attempting to sell their own
confectionery by representing it to the public as the production of
the plaintiff, this, and not an infringement of the trade mark,
should be charged in the bill as the ground of relief."
From this decision three judges dissented, Mitchell J. deliver-
ing the opinion and basing it upon the short ground that this was
a clear case of fraudulent intent on the part of the defendant to
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Tepresent his own goods as those of the plaintiff and that equity
should, and usually did, grant relief without reference to the strict
doctrine of trade marks.
The general rule seems to be well settled that the letters of the
alphabet are common property, and cannot be exclusively appro-
priated by any one so as to prevent their use in a usual and legiti-
mate way by others; and that one may use his own name, though
it be identical with that of another engaged in the same line of
business, and thotigh such use ddes, in fact, inflict loss upon that
-other, SUBJECT, NEVERTHELESS, in both instances, to the qualifica-
tion that neither the letters nor the name are so used as to practice
a fraud upon the rival manufacturer or to deceive the public. Their
use must be strictly confined to the purpose of indicating the
-origin, character, quality or ownership of the goods, and the
weight of authority seems to require that one shall exercise great
caution to prevent injury to him who has first used the name and
established its reputation. In such cases the intent to deceive
became the criterion, and this being present, the courts will enjoin
the use of the name.
In this case the plaintiff has declared for an infringement of his
trade mark, and under this has proved that defendant is fraudu-
lently selling his goods as those of the plaintiff, to the deception
of the public, and his, the plaintiff's, injury. The answer of the
court is, that plaintiff has not the exclusive right to the trade mark,
which he has alleged. Now it would seem that as between two
persons having the same name, that one who has established its
reputation in the business has a prima facie right to its exclusive
use as a trade mark. The later comer may indeed show that he also
has the right, but his claim is refuted by proof of his bad faith.
It is too well settled to require the citation of authority, that where
such bad faith in the use of one's name is shown he may be
restrained, but the question raised by this decision is, as to whether
the injunction will be granted on the ground of infringement of
trade mark, or whether the bill must be based on the injury which
is being wrought by the defendant's deceit; and the court have
taken the latter view.
Since the raison d'etre of trade marks is so to characterize one
man's goods, that they shall not be mistaken for those of another,
and to prevent the fraudulent representation by the latter that his
goods are those of the former, it would seem that when a plaintiff
has shown that the very wrong has occurred to prevent which trade
marks were created and protected by the courts, that it is a some-
what technical rule, and, (as suggested by Mr. Justice Mitchell), one
not supported by authority, which decides that recovery cannot be
had because the bill charges an interference with the trade mark,
and not an interference with the right which the complainant has
sought to protect by the use of the trade mark.
The master found that the defendant had and was perpetrating a
fraud upon the plaintiff, who thereupon was entitled to relief, and
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granting that what plaintiff called his trade mark was not valid in
all particulars, it at least sufficed to indicate the nature of the right
-claimed and the scope of the wrong which was being done; and the
spirit of the complaint thus being shown, it would not have been.
without the equitable jurisdiction of the court to do justice between,
the parties.
